The subject matter of this book is the nature and mode of existence of institutional social reality, i.e. of nation-states, money, corporations, clubs and other social institutions. In the first part of the book Searle proposes an ontology of social institutions, in the second part he applies this theory to specific, mostly philosophical questions such as the nature of power, the status of human rights and the significance of rationality for life in human society.

An individualistic social ontology attributes mental states merely to individuals, and denies the existence of collective attitudes such as we-intentions. Furthermore, if collectives cannot be bearers of minds, then collective mental states cannot serve as explanatory factors. In my paper, I first show that we-intentions do serve considerable explanatory purposes within developmental psychology. I then propose an account of weintentions as complexes of intentions of different individuals. These intentions are of a distinct kind: de-re-intentions, grounded in external objects in a specific situation. This grounding is achieved by embodied cognition, through appropriate senso-motoric activities. I conclude that my account of we-intentions is compatible with an individualistic social ontology.