Inability to clearly defend against the criticisms of frequentist methods has turned many a frequentist away from venturing into foundational battlegrounds. Conceding the distorted perspectives drawn from overly literal and radical expositions of what Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson `really thought‘, some deny they matter to current practice. The goal of this paper is not merely to call attention to the howlers that pass as legitimate criticisms of frequentist error statistics, but also to sketch the main lines of an alternative statistical philosophy within which to better articulate the roles and value of frequentist tools.

Debates over the philosophical foundations of statistics have a long and fascinating history; the decline of a lively exchange between philosophers of science and statisticians is relatively recent. Is there something special about 2011 (and beyond) that calls for renewed engagement in these fields? I say yes. There are some surprising, pressing, and intriguing new philosophical twists on the long-running controversies that cry out for philosophical analysis, and I hope to galvanize my co-contributors as well as the reader to take up the general cause.