Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics

 

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

A scenario of dismissal is used to illustrate a business ethical reflection that is guided by the method of reflective equilibrium. Several rules of dismissal are considered with respect to an already proved practice and to the goals of the corporation. The deliberation shows how the demand for coherence between norms and practice and for the achievement of certain purposes works. The limits and chances of business ethical reflection are indicated on the basis of the discussed example. By providing the methodological frame business ethicists support decision makers in making enlightened decisions. They do not supply the decision maker with the right ethical theory‘ which provides
Economists, and notably health economists, very often add to their policy recommendations the formula ,from an economic point of view‘. The contribution starts by exploring what the message of this clause to non-economists might be. The vagueness that it brings about as to the general acceptability of claims to ,rational‘ allocation, ,best‘ outcomes etc. is then, first, assessed with respect to the recent debate about IQWiG’s (the German equivalent to Britain’s NICE) unorthodox methodology of health care evaluation. Weaknesses within the theoretical basis of standard health economist’s evaluations, well-known by theoretical economists but rarely mentioned when it comes to policy advice, are then, second, pointed out. Finally, some consequences are drawn for what has to be done to enhance the quality and impact of policy advice in the area of health resource allocation.
The question which moral status the embryo has is of great practical significance because the possibility to justify a governmental prohibition of a set of important therapeutical and scientific measures depends on a special and therefore legal protectable status of the embryo. The identity argument which is often used in this context cannot constitute this status due to its mere epistemic character under the condition of the determinism.
In several works, Hartmut Kliemt has developed an original account on the necessity of rationing health care and on how a rationing policy should be carried out. While I agree on several important points of that view, there is one important aspect of his account that I do not find plausible: his claim that the so-called `acute principle‘ (a principle that gives absolute preeminence to rescuing identified lives from dying) should be one of the basic criteria to carry out a rationing policy in a liberal state. After explaining Kliemt’s view on rationing health care and, more specifically, the foundations of the acute principle, I argue that the acute principle is not supported by our basic moral intuitions. I then apply the previous argument to the case of rationing, arguing for the necessity of a compromise among intuitions supporting the acute principle and other moral intuitions. Finally, I try to show that a feasible system of public health care services is conceivable. In doing so, I make use, with some relevant modifications, of Kliemt’s own ideas.
Not infrequently, the so-called Rule of Rescue gets invoked as an allegedly self-evident constraint to the CBE-goal of maximizing health benefit with a given health budget. In this paper this constraint is critically analyzed. It will be argued that some of its implications are worth considering – but not the inherently vague Rule as such.
Limited resources are the permanent condition in health care. Rationing, according to H. Kliemt, is the distribution of limited resources below market prices to all people in need for these resources. Therefore, rationing is a basic component of every kind of human health care system. However, the crucial problem is how to find just and fair rules for this distribution under the premise, that every patient should have the same chance. The allocation of organs for transplant can serve as a paradigmatic example for studying rationing problems, as shortage of organs cannot be denied nor abolished. H. Kliemt compared the situation with the classic decathlon. The selection of factors and the combination and weighing of these factors for winning a donor organ‘ should strictly be related to individuals. Non-medical criteria should generally be accepted and authorized as far as they are relevant to the question of justice and fairness. In this paper the so-called solidarity model‘, an example of joint research with Hartmut Kliemt, is introduced as an allocation system with the power to enhance justice and fairness.
The rapid progress in medical technology makes it unavoidable to ration health care. In the discussion how to ration many people claim that principles of justice in distributing scarce resources should be applied. In this paper we argue that medical resources are not scarce as such but scarcity is a necessary by-product of collective financing arrangements such as social health insurance. So the right question to ask is the determination of the benefit package of such an institution. Hartmut Kliemt is currently involved in a commendable interdisciplinary research project in which principles of prioritization‘ of medical care are studied. This contribution adds a specific perspective to this endeavour: we ask how the goal of distributive justice can be interpreted in this context and compare different approaches to implementing just‘ allocation mechanisms.
We often lack clear procedures for assessing statements and arguments advanced in everyday conversations, political campaigns, advertisements, and the other multifarious uses to which ordinary language can be put. Critical thinking is a method for evaluating arguments couched in ordinary, non-formal language. Legal education should foster this argumentative skill as an ability to assess the open-end variety of arguments that may arise in legal disputes. I will argue that the ability of critical thinking helps lawyers to thrive even in legal cultures that are hostile to critical thinking. There is, therefore, a happy harmony between professional and moral reasons to teach critical thinking at law schools: it promotes epistemic as well as instrumental rationality.
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of rights‘, both moral and legal. The Will Theory‘ and the Interest Theory‘–the two main views–can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will contend in this paper that the discussion of value pluralism‘ in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.
This paper uses the concept of power to analyze Machiavelli’s The Prince and the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. This helps to distil the elements that form the Machiavelli program that has its short-term aim in the formation of a national state of Italy. A unification of Italy under the umbrella of a princely family (such as identified with Cesare Borgia) was meant to be the first stage in an evolutionary process which, in the end, could lead to a more or less stable republican system. For the latter, the Roman Republic as described in the Discourses is Machiavelli’s model. The use of power, but also the minimization of cruelties, and the participation of the people, either in the form of militia to successfully fight foreign armies or to support the princely government, are major ingredients to this process.

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RMM is an interdisciplinary open access journal focusing on issues of rationality, market mechanisms, and the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. It provides a forum for dialogue between philosophy, economics, and related disciplines, encouraging critical reflection on the foundations and implications of economic processes.

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