Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics

 

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

Economists claim that principles of rationality are normative principles. Nevertheless, they go on to explain why it is in a person’s own interest to be rational. If this were true, being rational itself would be a means to an end, and rationality could be interpreted in a non-normative or naturalistic way. The alternative is not attractive: if the only argument in favor of principles of rationality were their intrinsic appeal, a commitment to rationality would be irrational, making the notion of rationality self-defeating. A comprehensive conception of rationality should recommend itself: it should be rational to be rational. Moreover, since rational action requires rational beliefs concerning means-ends relations, a naturalistic conception of rationality has to cover rational belief formation including the belief that it is rational to be rational. The paper considers four conceptions of rationality and asks whether they can deliver the goods: Bayesianism, perfect rationality (just in case that it differs from Bayesianism), ecological rationality (as a version of bounded rationality), and critical rationality, the conception of rationality characterizing critical rationalism. The answer is summarized in the paper’s title.
H.L.A.Hart’s seminal book The Concept of Law entails arguments which are also of substantial importance for social theory: his claim that the existence of social and legal norms presupposes the dissemination of an internal point of view among the members of a social and legal community presents a serious challenge for any explanation of social order. Hartmut Kliemt emphasizes this aspect of Hart’s work time and again in his own writings and surely with very good reasons. In my paper I will try to reconstruct Hart’s theory in detail. I will argue that we have to clarify the different dimensions of the concept of an internal point of view to be able to assess its consequences for a theory of social and legal order especially for a rational choice approach which at first sight seems to be incompatible with the concept of an internal point of view.
In this paper I argue, contrary to Hartmut Kliemt, that it is possible to be both a Humean and, in James Buchanan’s sense, a contractarian. Hume sees principles of justice and political allegiance not as actual or hypothetical products of explicit agreement, but as conventions that have emerged spontaneously. However, it is fundamental to Hume’s analysis that conventions are mutually advantageous, and hence cognate with agreements. The core idea in Buchanan’s contractarianism is that the proper role of government is to implement voluntary exchanges between individuals, not to define and maximise a unified conception of social welfare. Although real politics cannot be based entirely on unanimous agreement, the voluntary exchange approach provides a valuable structure for normative economics.
This Festschrift honours Hartmut Kliemt on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Hartmut Kliemt’s work covers a huge number of topics, including publications on John Rawls’ theory of justice, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism or James Buchanan’s constitutionalism, the problems of cloning, legal punishment, state power, anarchism, the model of homo oeconomicus, game theory, the philosophy of science, ethics, the welfare state, the theory of law, rationing in health care, organ transplantation and homeopathy …

Journal Information

RMM is an interdisciplinary open access journal focusing on issues of rationality, market mechanisms, and the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. It provides a forum for dialogue between philosophy, economics, and related disciplines, encouraging critical reflection on the foundations and implications of economic processes.

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